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Abstract
This paper provides a mathematical analysis of the Marxian theory
of the exploitation of labour in general equilibrium models. The two
main deﬁnitions of Marxian exploitation in the literature, proposed
by Morishima (1974) and Roemer (1982), respectively, are analysed
in the context of general convex economies. It is shown that, contrary
to the received view, in general these deﬁnitions do not preserve the
so-called Fundamental Marxian Theorem (FMT), which states that
the exploitation of labour is synonymous with positive proﬁts. A new
deﬁnition of Marxian labor exploitation is proposed, which is shown
to preserve the FMT in general convex economies, in equilibrium.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D31, D46, B51, B24.
Keywords: exploitation, proﬁts, reproducible solutions.
1 Introduction
The derivation of a general relation between the exploitation of labour and
the existence of proﬁts, and the deﬁnition of an appropriate notion of gen-
eral equilibrium have historically been central (and partly related) issues in
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1mathematical Marxian economics. From a theoretical viewpoint, this is due
to the fundamental relevance of the theory of exploitation, and of the no-
tion of the reproducibility of an economic system in Marxian approaches.
From a formal viewpoint, this is explained by the diﬃculty of proving some
core propositions in exploitation theory which Marx himself, and the early
Marxists, took for evident.
To be precise, a key tenet of Marxist theory is the so-called Fundamen-
tal Marxian Theorem (hereafter, FMT) which establishes a correspondence
between a positive proﬁt rate and the existence of exploitation. This the-
orem was originally proved by Okishio (1963), and later named as such by
Morishima (1973), in the context of simple Leontief economies with homoge-
neous labour. Yet, outside of stylised, linear two-class economies, both the
appropriate deﬁnition of exploitation and the validity of the core insights of
exploitation theory, including the FMT, are not uncontroversial, and indeed
a number of approaches have been proposed in an attempt to generalise the
FMT (see Yoshihara, 2010).
This has generated a substantial literature. Whereas the FMT was suc-
cessfully extended to Leontief economies with heterogeneous labour by Fuji-
mori (1982), Krause (1982), and others, in a famous book Steedman (1977)
proved that the FMT does not hold in more general von Neumann economies.
One solution was proposed by Morishima (1974) based on a new deﬁnition
of exploitation, and focusing on von Neumann’s notion of Balanced Growth
Equilibrium. Yet Roemer (1981) showed that if Morishima’s (1974) deﬁ-
nition is adopted, the FMT does not hold, in general, in economies with a
convex cone technology, if a diﬀerent notion of equilibrium is adopted, namely
that of reproducible solution (Roemer, 1980), unless some restrictions on the
production set are imposed. Later, Roemer (1982) proposed an alternative
deﬁnition of exploitation, which according to him would generalise the FMT
(and other key Marxian propositions) to convex cone economies at repro-
ducible solutions.
Various authors have objected to Morishima’s (1974) and Roemer’s (1982)
deﬁnitions of exploitation on theoretical and exegetical grounds and other
approaches have been proposed (for recent debates, see Veneziani, 2004;
Flaschel 2010). Yet they remain the most prominent deﬁnitions in the litera-
ture, and this is to a signiﬁcant extent due precisely to the formal derivation
of the FMT. The relevance of the FMT, in fact, is such that although it is
proved as a result, its epistemological status is that of a postulate: the appro-
priate deﬁnition of exploitation is widely considered to be one which preserves
2FMT.1 There are various reasons why the FMT is considered a key tenet
of exploitation theory, and of Marxian economics in general. In the stan-
dard approach, the FMT is often interpreted as the formalisation of Marx’s
claim that proﬁts are uniquely determined by exploitation in class divided
economies. According to Roemer (1980, 1981), instead, the FMT captures
the productiveness of capitalist economies and it provides the necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for the existence of nontrivial general equilibria. From
a normative perspective, however, the FMT is relevant because it captures a
key insight of the theory of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour,
according to which exploitative relations are characterised by a diﬀerence
between the amount of labour that an individual provides and the amount
of labour contained in some relevant bundle that she does (or can) purchase
with her income. From this perspective, exploitation theory focuses on in-
equalities in the distribution of income and labour, and thus it captures some
core inequalities of well-being freedom (see Rawls, 1971; Sen, 1985), which
are characteristic of capitalist economies. According to the FMT, proﬁts play
a key role in the generation of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour
(and thus of inequalities in well-being freedom), since they represent the way
in which capitalists appropriate social surplus and social labour.
In this paper, the FMT is analysed in the context of general economies
with convex cone production technologies, both assuming a representative
agent and allowing for heterogeneous preferences over consumption. Within
this general framework, the classic deﬁnitions of exploitation proposed by
Morishima (1974) and Roemer (1982) are reconsidered, and it is shown that,
contrary to the received wisdom, neither of them preserves the FMT in gen-
eral. If the equilibrium notion is that of a reproducible solution, then the
FMT does not hold under Roemer’s deﬁnition, even if workers are identi-
cal and consume a uniform subsistence bundle. Further, if one allows for
heterogeneity in workers’ preferences, then the FMT does not hold under
Morishima’s deﬁnition, either. A new deﬁnition of exploitation is proposed
which focuses on workers’ income, rather than on their consumption bun-
dle.T h i s d e ﬁnition seems preferable on theoretical grounds, because the
exploitation status of an agent is identiﬁed based on the objective features
of an economy (including data on production, income, labour supply, etc.),
rather than on the subjective and idiosyncratic factors driving consumption
1According to Roemer (1982), the Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle plays
a similar epistemological role. This is brieﬂy discussed in the concluding section below.
3choices. As argued by Yoshihara and Veneziani (2011), Marxian exploita-
tion theory is inherently objectivist in nature, and two agents with the same
endowments, labour supply, and income should have the same exploitation
status, regardless of their choice of a consumption bundle. Furthermore, it
is shown that if this deﬁnition is adopted, the FMT holds in general convex
economies both with a representative agent and if heterogeneous preferences
are allowed for.
This paper is related to a small but growing recent literature on ex-
ploitation theory. A conceptually related deﬁnition, for example, has been
proposed, and axiomatically derived, by Yoshihara (2010) and Yoshihara
and Veneziani (2009, 2010). Moreover, although this paper focuses on static
perfectly competitive economies, the mathematical Marxian exploitation the-
ory has been recently extended to models of contested exchange (Yoshihara,
1998) and to dynamic economies with intertemporally optimising agents
(Veneziani, 2007).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic
model. Section 3 introduces the two main received deﬁnitions of Marxian
exploitation and proves that the FMT does not hold in general under either
of them. Section 4 presents a new deﬁnition of exploitation and shows that
it preserves the FMT in general. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
An economy consists of a set H of agents, or households, who trade m com-
modities. Let R be the set of real numbers, and let R+ (resp., R++)b et h e
set of nonnegative (resp., strictly positive) real numbers. Production tech-
nology is freely available to all agents, who can operate any activity in the
production set P, which has elements of the form α =( −α0,−α,α),w h e r e
α0 ∈ R+ is the direct labour input; α ∈ Rm
+ are the inputs of the produced
goods; and α ∈ Rm
+ are the outputs of the m goods. Thus, elements of P
are vectors in R2m+1. The net output vector arising from α is denoted as
b α ≡ α − α. Let the vector with all components equal to zero be denoted as
0. The following assumptions on P hold throughout the paper.2
2For all vectors x, y ∈ Rp, x = y if and only if xi = yi (i =1 ,...,p); x ≥ y if and
only if x = y and x 6= y; x>yif and only if xi >y i (i =1 ,...,p). Note that vectors are
columns unless otherwise speciﬁed.
4Assumption 0 (A0). P is a closed convex cone with vertex 0.
Assumption 1 (A1). For all α ∈ P,i fα ≥ 0 then α0 > 0.
Assumption 2 (A2). For all c ∈ Rm
+,t h e r ei sa nα ∈ P such that b α = c.
A1 implies that labour is indispensable to produce any non-negative and
non-zero output vector. A2 states that any non-negative commodity vector
is producible as net output. It is worth stressing that A0∼A2 represent a
signiﬁcant generalisation of the standard linear technologies analysed in the
literature on the FMT, which represent special cases of the model considered
in this paper. For example, a von Neumann technology is deﬁned by a tuple
(B,A,L) where B is an m × n output matrix; A is an m × n input matrix;
and L is a 1 × n vector of labour coeﬃcients, and the production possibility




2m+1 | ∃x ∈ R
n
+ : α 5 (−Lx,−Ax,Bx)
ª
.
P(A,B,L) is a closed convex cone in R2m+1 with 0 ∈ P(A,B,L) and it satisﬁes
A1∼A2.
Although diﬀerent assumptions concerning agents’ behaviour will be con-
sidered below, assumption A0∼A2 will be retained throughout the paper.
For the sake of simplicity, in what follows, economies whose production set
satisﬁes A0∼A2 will be referred to as general convex economies.
Given P, the set of production activities feasible with α0 = k units of
labour can be deﬁned as follows:
P (α0 = k) ≡ {(−α0,−α,α) ∈ P | α0 = k},
and the set of net output vectors feasible with k units of labour is:
b P (α0 = k) ≡ {b α ∈ R
m | ∃α
0 ∈ P (α0 = k):α
0 − α
0 = b α}.
For any set X ⊆ R × ... × R, ∂X ≡ {x ∈ X | @x0 ∈ X s.t. x0 >x } is the
frontier of X,a n dX◦ ≡ X\∂X is the interior of X.
Given a market economy, a (row) vector p ∈ Rm
+ describes the price
of each of the m commodities in the economy. The nominal wage rate is
normalised to one. For any agent ν ∈ H,l e tων ∈ Rm
+ denote her initial
endowments. In the literature on the FMT, it is assumed that the set of
agents H can be partitioned into two disjoint subsets, namely the working
class, denoted as W, which comprises agents with no initial endowments; and
5the set N of capitalists, who own at least some productive assets. Formally,
W = {ν ∈ H | ων = 0} and N = {ν ∈ H | ων ≥ 0}. Further, it is assumed
that workers are endowed with one unit of (homogeneous) labour.
For a given price vector p and wage rate w =1 , capitalists are assumed
to maximise proﬁts subject to their wealth constraint. Formally, each ν ∈ N
solves:3
choose α










The set of production processes that solve this problem is denoted by Aν (p,1).
In line with standard classical political economy, it is assumed that capital-
ists do not work and do not consume: they use their revenues to accumulate
for production in the next period.
Following the standard literature on the FMT, workers are assumed to
supply a ﬁxed amount of labour, equal to their labour endowment, and to
be abundant relative to social productive assets. This assumption reﬂects
the Marxian view that involuntary unemployment is a structural feature of
capitalist economies. Workers’ consumption behaviour, instead, will be spec-
iﬁed below, where two diﬀerent models are considered, by assuming ﬁrst that
workers consume a ﬁxed subsistence bundle, and then relaxing this assump-
tion by endowing them with heterogeneous demand functions for commodi-
ties.
3 The classic approaches to the FMT
3.1 Two deﬁnitions of exploitation
In Marxian theory, exploitation is conceived of as the unequal exchange of
labour between agents: considering a worker μ ∈ W, exploitative relations
are characterised by systematic diﬀerences between the labour contributed by
μ to the economy and the labour ‘received’ by μ, which is given by the amount
of labour contained, or embodied, in some relevant consumption bundle(s).
3Thus, noting that inputs are traded at the beginning of the period and outputs at the
end, the optimisation programme can be interpreted as incorporating an assumption of
stationary expectations on prices (see Roemer 1980; 1981, Chapter 2).
6Therefore, for any bundle c ∈ Rm
+, it is necessary to deﬁne the labour value (or
labour content) of c. Outside of standard Leontief economies, the deﬁnition
of the labour content of c is not obvious, and various deﬁnitions have, in
fact, been proposed. In this section, the two most prominent deﬁnitions in
the literature are presented, namely the deﬁnitions proposed by Morishima
(1974; see also Roemer, 1981), and Roemer (1982).
In Morishima’s (1974) approach, the labour value of a bundle of goods is
independent of the equilibrium the economy is in. For any c ∈ Rm
+,l e t
φ(c) ≡ {α ∈ P | b α = c},
denote the set of activities that produce at least c as net output. Then:
Deﬁnition 1 (Morishima, 1974): The labour value of a bundle c, l.v.(c),i s
l.v.(c) ≡ min{α0|α =( −α0,−α,α) ∈ φ(c)}.
Therefore, if a worker spends one unit of labour and buys the bundle
c ∈ Rm
+\{0}, the rate of labour exploitation is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 (Morishima, 1974): The rate of labour exploitation at a con-






It is easy to see that φ(c) is non-empty by A2, and that the set {α0 | α ∈ φ(c)}
is bounded below by 0, by the assumption 0 ∈ P and A1. Thus, l.v.(c) is
well-deﬁned since P is closed. Moreover, by A1, l.v.(c) is positive whenever
c 6= 0,s ot h a te(c) is well-deﬁned.
Morishima (1974) showed that, in the balanced growth equilibrium of a
von Neumann linear economy with joint production, the warranted rate of
proﬁt is positive if and only if the rate of exploitation in Deﬁnition 2 is posi-
tive. This result holds even if the von Neumann technology contains inferior
production processes. Roemer (1981) proved that if the more general equi-
librium concept of reproducible solution (see Deﬁnition 5 below) is adopted,
then the FMT holds under Deﬁnition 2 in economies with general convex
technologies, provided inferior processes are ruled out. Roemer (1981) called
the latter assumption Independence of Production (see Assumption 3 below).
7These results would seem to settle the issue of the validity of the FMT,
and to provide strong support to Deﬁnition 2. According to Romer (1982),
however, Deﬁnition 2 does not preserve other key axioms of Marxian ex-
ploitation theory (such as the correspondence between class and exploita-
tion status) and this led him to propose an alternative deﬁnition. Unlike
in Morishima (1974), the deﬁnition of labour value in Roemer (1982) de-
pends on the speciﬁc equilibrium the economy is in. Given (p,1) ∈ R
m+1
+
and α ∈ P,l e tπ(p,1;α) ≡
pb α−α0
pα+α0 be the corresponding proﬁtr a t ea n dl e t
P (p,1) ≡ argmax{π(p,1;α) | α ∈ P} be the set of proﬁt—rate-maximising
production activities. Given (p,1) ∈ R
m+1





α ∈ P (p,1) | b α = c
ª
,
denote the set of proﬁt-rate-maximising activities which produce at least c
as net output. The labour value of a bundle c is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3 (Roemer, 1982): The labour value of commodity vector c at
(p,1) ∈ R
m+1
+ , l.v.(c;p,1),i sg i v e nb y
l.v.(c;p,1) ≡ min{α0 | α =( −α0,−α,α) ∈ φ(c;p,1)}.
The rate of labour exploitation is stated in the next deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4 (Roemer, 1982): The rate of labour exploitation at a consump-
tion bundle c ∈ Rm







It is easy to verify that l.v.(c;p,1) is well-deﬁned if φ(c;p,1) is not empty,
and it is positive whenever c 6= 0,s ot h a te(c;p,1) is well-deﬁned. Also,
l.v.(c;p,1) = l.v.(c) so that e(c;p,1) > 0 implies e(c) > 0.4
Although Roemer (1982) does not provide an explicit formal analysis of
the FMT using Deﬁnition 4, he argues that Deﬁn i t i o n4i ss u p e r i o rt ot h e
4Note that φ(c;p,1) may be empty; for instance, if P (p,1) consists of production
activities whose corresponding net outputs are semi-positive vectors, then φ(c;p,1) is
empty whenever c>0,s ot h a tl.v.(c;p,1) cannot be deﬁned. This issue need not concern
us here since the set l.v.(c;p,1) is never empty whenever equilibrium price vectors are
considered, as in the analysis below.
8alternatives (including Deﬁnition 2) also because the FMT continues to hold,
provided a suitable restriction on the production set is imposed (Roemer,
1982, p.158). To this issue we turn next.
3.2 Roemer’s (1982) deﬁnition reconsidered
In this subsection, the standard model for the FMT is analysed. In line
with the literature, it is assumed that every agent in the working class con-
sumes an exogenously given subsistence vector b ∈ Rm
+ , per unit of labour
supplied. Thus, in this subsection a convex economy is given by technology




, and is denoted as E(P,H,b,Ω).T h e d e ﬁnition of
equilibrium for E(P,H,b,Ω) can then be provided:
Deﬁnition 5 (Roemer, 1981, Deﬁnition 2.5, p.41): A reproducible solution




,w h e r ep ∈ Rm
+ ,
such that:
(a) ∀ν ∈ N, αν ∈ Aν (p,1) (proﬁt maximisation);
(b) b α = α0b (reproducibility),
where b α ≡
P




(c) pb =1(subsistence wage); and
(d) α + α0b 5 ω (social feasibility),
where α ≡
P
ν∈N αν and ω ≡
P
ν∈N ων.
Part (a) is standard and needs no further comment. Part (b) states that
net output in every sector should at least be suﬃcient for employed workers’
total consumption. This amounts to requiring that social endowments do not
decrease, because (b) is equivalent to ω−(α + α0b)+α = ω,w h e r et h er i g h t
hand side is the social stocks at the beginning of the period, and the left hand
side is the stocks at the beginning of next period. Given that workers are
abundant relative to productive assets, part (c) states that unemployment
drives the equilibrium real wage rate down to the subsistence level. Finally,
part (d) requires that intermediate inputs and workers’ consumption can
be anticipated from current stocks, since wages are assumed to be paid in
advance.
The existence of a RS is guaranteed by the following proposition.
9Proposition 1 (Roemer 1980; 1981): Let b ∈ Rm
++. Under A1 and A2, a
RS exists for the economy E(P,H,b,Ω).
Next, the assumption of independence of production is stated (see Roe-
mer, 1981, p.47), which rules out inferior production processes from P:
Assumption 3 (A3). (Independence of Production) If (−α0,−α,α) ∈ P
and 0 5 c ≤ b α,t h e nt h e r ee x i s t s(−α0
0,−α0,α0) ∈ P such that b α
0 = c and
α0
0 < α0.
Under A3, it can be shown that the FMT holds when Deﬁnition 2 is adopted:
Proposition 2 (Roemer, 1981, Theorem 2.11): Let b ∈ Rm
++.U n d e r
A1∼A3, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) e(b) > 0;
(ii) there exists a RS yielding positive total proﬁts;
(iii) all RS’s yield positive total proﬁts.
A ﬁrst important point to note is that if Deﬁnition 4 is adopted instead,
it is not obvious at all, even under A3, that the FMT continues to hold,
because e(b) > 0 does not necessarily imply e(b;p) > 0.5 Indeed, Roemer
(1982, Chapter 5, p.158, footnote 6) suggested that A3 be modiﬁed to hold
on P (p,1) in order to prove the FMT using Deﬁnition 4. Formally:
Assumption 30 (A30). Let (p,1) be the price vector at a RS. If (−α0,−α,α) ∈
P (p,1) and 0 5 c ≤ b α, then there exists (−α0
0,−α0,α0) ∈ P (p,1) such that
b α
0 = c and α0
0 < α0.
Unlike A3, however, A30 seems rather uncompelling. A3 requires the elim-
ination of inferior activities from possible production sets: this is a reasonable
technological restriction on the feasible set, which implies no signiﬁcant loss
of generality. A30 eliminates a very large class of production sets, including,
for example, all those sets in which there are RS’s with a unique proﬁt-
maximising path. One example is given in the proof of Theorem 1 below
(see the economy described in Figure 1), but A30 a l s or u l e so u tt h ee n t i r e
class of production sets whose corresponding net output sets, b P (α0 =1 ) ,a r e
5Note that if (p,1) is a RS, e(b;p) is well-deﬁned regardless of the property of P (p,1).
This is because in any RS, it is always true that φ(b;p,1) is non-empty by the fact that
for the aggregate social production α =
P
ν∈N αν under the RS, α ∈ P (p,1) and b α = α0b
hold.
10representable by strictly concave and continuously diﬀerentiable functions in
which any RS has a unique proﬁt-maximising path. But this seems a rather
signiﬁcant loss of generality and the rationale for this restriction is quite un-
clear. Moreover, it is not possible in general to check whether or not a given
economy satisﬁes A30 before characterising the set of RS’s of the economy.
This implies that the robustness of the FMT using Deﬁnition 4 should
be checked under A3, without appealing to the ad hoc version suggested by
Roemer (1982). The following theorem, however, shows that even if A3 is
assumed, the FMT does not hold in general under Deﬁnition 4.





yields positive total proﬁts but e(b;p,1) = 0.
Proof. 1. (The economy) Let m =2 , W = {μ},a n dN = {ν}.L e t





























Then, let P be a closed, convex cone subset of R5 such that
1) 0 ∈ P;a n d
2) co{α1,α2,α3} = P (α0 =1 ) ,w h e r ecoX is the convex hull of a set X.
P satisﬁes all the assumptions on the production set, including A3.
2. (The equilibria) We will now characterise the set of RSs. Note that:
∀p ∈ 4
2\{(1,0)}, pω <p(α












where 42 is the two-dimensional simplex. Note also that, by Deﬁnition 5(b),
if ((p,1),α) is a RS, then b α = α0b.L e tα12 ≡ 1
2α1+ 1
2α2:t h e nco{α12,α2} = ©
α0 ∈ ∂P (α0 =1 )| b α
0 = b
ª
. Thus, by the convex cone property of P,i f
((p,1),α) is a RS, there exist t ∈ (0,1] and α0 ∈ co{α12,α2} such that
α = tα0.
Let 42 (α2) ≡
©
p ∈ 42 | 1
3 5 p1 5 1
2, 2
3 = p2 = 1
2
ª
.I f p/ ∈ 42 (α2),i ti s
immediate to check that there is no α0 ∈ co{α12,α2} such that for some
appropriate t ∈ (0,1], tα0 constitutes a proﬁt maximiser at that price. Hence







,t h e npb α
1 − α1
0 = pb α
2 − α2
0 = pb α
0 − α0
0 >p b α
00 − α00
0 for
any α0 ∈ co{α1,α2} and any α00 ∈ co{α2,α3}\{α2}. However, because of
the property (*), the capital constraint in the proﬁt maximisation problem













,t h e npb α
2 − α2
0 = pb α
00 − α00
0 >p b α
0 − α0
0 for any α0 ∈
co{α1,α2}\{α2} and any α00 ∈ co{α2,α3}. Thus, by the same reasons








If p is such that 1
3 <p 1 < 1
2, 2
3 >p 2 > 1
2,t h e nα2 i st h eu n i q u ep r o ﬁt
maximiser at that price.
In sum, at any RS, α = α2 must hold. Indeed, for any p∗ ∈ 42 (α2),i t
is immediate to check that ((p∗,1),α2) constitutes a RS. Moreover, in this
case, π(p∗,1;α2) > 0.
Insert Figure 1 around here.
3. (FMT) We can now check that at any RS ((p∗,1),α2),w h e r ep∗ ∈
42 (α2), e(b;p∗,1) = 0 holds, whereas proﬁts are positive. This is because
P (p∗,1) = {tα2 ∈ P | t ∈ R++} and φ(α2
0b;p∗,1) = {α2}, which implies
l.v.(α2
0b;p∗,1) = α2
0,s ot h a tl.v.(b;p∗,1) = 1.
Remark: Note that in the above proof of Theorem 1, though the constructed
economy has b ∈ Rm
++,t h i sp r o o fc a nb ea p p l i e de v e nt ot h ec a s eo fb =( 0 ,1),
so that the result does not depend on the assumption of b ∈ Rm
++.
Theorem 1 proves that the FMT does not hold, in general, if Deﬁnition
4 is adopted, even under A3. It is actually worth noting that Theorem 1
does not only prove that there are economies in which at some equilibrium
allocation the FMT does not hold. More strongly, and more signiﬁcantly
from a theoretical viewpoint, Theorem 1 shows that there are economies
in which the FMT never holds in equilibrium if Roemer’s (1982) deﬁnition
is adopted. The intuition is the following: in the economy considered, at
any RS ((p,1),α2),t h ea c t i v i t yα2 is the unique proﬁt maximiser at p,a n d
the corresponding net output b α
2 does not strictly dominate the subsistence
bundle b, as described in Figure 1. In this case, the minimum amount of direct
labour necessary to produce at least b (among proﬁt-maximising production
activities) is equal to the amount of direct labour expended at the RS.
To be sure, the economy considered in the proof of Theorem 1 does not
satisfy A30. But, as already noted, the theoretical relevance of A30 is dubious
12and indeed one may wonder whether the reason of the failure of the FMT may
lie elsewhere. As argued in the Introduction, the speciﬁc notion of equilibrium
adopted is quite important in the analysis of the FMT: for example, if A3 is
dropped, Morishima’s (1974) deﬁnition allows one to derive the FMT if one
focuses on balanced growth equilibria, but not if RSs are considered. Then,
one may argue that the deﬁnition of exploitation is correct, but the notion
of equilibrium adopted, namely the RS, is inappropriate.
Arguably, Deﬁnition 5 captures various key aspects of the Marxian notion
of reproducibility of an economy, including its emphasis on social feasibility
(condition (d)). The latter aspect, however, represents an important depar-
ture from standard Walrasian notions of equilibrium and therefore it may be
worth considering whether the FMT holds under Deﬁnition 4 by adopting
an equilibrium notion without the explicit capital constraint. Formally, let:6





,w h e r ep ∈ Rm
+, such that conditions (b) and (c)
of Deﬁnition 5 hold, and:
(a*) ∀ν ∈ N, αν ∈ A∗ν (p,1) (proﬁt maximisation),








| α0 ∈ P and α0
0 5 Wνª
and Wν
denotes ν’s ﬁnancial endowment;




0,a n dL ≡
P
ν∈N Wν.
The next Theorem provides partial support to the idea that the deﬁnition
of equilibrium is relevant for establishing a correspondence between proﬁts
and exploitation.
Theorem 2: Let b ∈ Rm
++.U n d e rA 1 ∼A3,f o ra n ye c o n o m yE(P,H,b,Ω),
the following statements hold:




such that [p∗ (b α
∗ − α∗
0b) > 0 ⇒
e(b;p∗,1) > 0];




,[ e(b;p,1) > 0 ⇒ p(b α − α0b) > 0].
Proof. 1. By Theorem 2.17 in Roemer (1981; Chapter 2; Appendix 2), we





6The equilibrium notion in Deﬁnition 5* is based upon Roemer (1981, pp.65-67).




, α0 = L by proﬁt maximisation, without




as an eﬃcient production point. In other words, pb α = pb α
0 holds for any
b α




.N o t e t h a t s i n c e b ∈ Rm
++ and b α = α0b,t h e nb α ∈ Rm
++.
Hence, by A3, p ∈ Rm
++ holds and therefore at a RS
p(b α − α0b) > 0 ⇔ b α − α0b ≥ 0.




,a n ds u p p o s ep(b α − α0b)=




,i tf o l l o w st h a tl.v.(α0b)=
L. Hence, noting that l.v.(α0b;p,1) = l.v.(α0b),i tm u s tb el.v.(α0b;p) = L,
so that e(b;p,1) 5 0.
4. Show (i). Let b ∈ ∂ b P (α0 =1 ) . Then, it follows from A3 that, for
any α ∈ P with b α − α0b = 0, b α − α0b = 0 holds. Therefore, for any RS*, ¡
(p,1),(αν)ν∈N
¢
, p(b α − α0b)=0 .
Let b ∈ b P◦ (α0 =1 ) . Then, there exists α∗ ∈ ∂P such that b α
∗ − α∗
0b>
0.L e t p∗ ∈ Rm
++ be a price vector which supports b α










ν∈N α∗ν = α∗. This is because it is easy to




given that initial wealth for capitalists is only to ﬁnance the purchase of
labour power. At this RS*, since b α
∗ − α∗
0b>0, p∗ (b α
∗ − α∗
0b) > 0 holds.
Moreover, by A3, there exists α∗∗ ∈ P such that b α
∗∗−α∗
0b = 0 and α∗∗
0 < α∗
0.
In particular, since b α
∗ −α∗
0b>0,w ec a nc h o o s eα∗∗ = tα∗ with t ∈ (0,1) by
t h ec o n ep r o p e r t yo fP. In this case, α∗∗ ∈ P (p∗,1) so that l.v.(α∗
0b;p∗,1) <
α∗
0.T h i si m p l i e se(b;p∗,1) > 0,a sd e s i r e d .
Theorem 2 proves that for every convex cone economy, there always ex-
ists one equilibrium allocation (as deﬁn e di nD e ﬁnition 5*) such that the
correspondence between proﬁts and exploitation holds. This result would
seem to establish the robustness of the FMT under Deﬁnition 4, without
any ad hoc restrictions on A3, provided the appropriate equilibrium concept
is adopted. This conclusion is unwarranted, though, as Theorem 2 proves
a weak FMT. In fact, for every economy, the weakening of the capitalists’
wealth constraints enlarges the set of equilibria and allows one to ﬁnd one
R S *s u c ht h a tt h ed e s i r e dr e l a t i o nb e t w e e np r o ﬁts and exploitation holds.
Y e tt h i si sn o tt r u ei ng e n e r a lf o revery equilibrium allocation, even if Deﬁn-
14ition 5* is adopted, since equilibria similar to the one described in the proof
of Theorem 1 are not ruled out.
Indeed, and this is the second limit of Theorem 2, it is possible that even
if workers supply a constant amount of labour and receive the same bundle
of wage goods, they may be exploited or not depending on the equilibrium
aggregate production point. For instance, given α0 > 0 and α0b>0,i f
b α − α0b>0 at a RS*, then they are exploited, while if b α
0 − α0b ≥ 0 at an-
other RS*, then economic relations may be nonexploitative. The latter situa-
tion may occur, for instance, if the boundary ∂ b P (α0 =1 )is representable by
a strictly concave and continuously diﬀerentiable function, because P (p0,1)





where t ∈ R++.T h i s
ambiguity seems rather dubious, at least if attention is restricted to equilib-
rium allocations in which capitalists maximise proﬁts, since the exploitation
status of workers should depend only upon the objective features of the labour
contract, such as α0 and α0b.7 Instead, the previous example suggests that
the actual choice of the aggregate (equilibrium) net output vector may in-
ﬂuence the workers’ exploitation status even if their labour conditions are
unchanged.
3.3 Morishima’s (1974) deﬁnition and workers’ het-
erogenous consumption demands
The previous analysis suggests that the deﬁnition of exploitation proposed
by Roemer (1982) is not superior to Morishima’s (1974), at least as far as
the FMT is concerned. Indeed, it fares strictly worse: if A3 is imposed, the
FMT holds in general at any RS of any convex economy E(P,H,b,Ω) under
Deﬁnition 2, but not under Deﬁnition 4. The next question, then, concerns
whether this result can be extended to more general economies. Although
the technologies allowed for are very general (and standard in microeconomic
theory), the assumptions on workers’ behaviour seem restrictive, as they rule
out both workers’ choice of consumption bundles and heterogeneity in pref-
erences. And both are among the important features of advanced economies
that make the issue of exploitation a contentious one today.
7If disequilibrium allocations are also considered, then capitalists’ choices - which may
turn out to be suboptimal ex post - may also be relevant for the determination of ex-
ploitation status. For a thorough discussion and an axiomatic defence of objectivism in
the Marxian theory of exploitation, see Yoshihara and Veneziani (2011).
15In this subsection, the validity of the FMT is analysed in economies with
heterogeneous workers, who have potentially diﬀerent consumption demands.
In standard Leontief economies, the assumption of heterogeneity of prefer-
ences has no implications for the validity of the FMT: a positive rate of proﬁt
prevails at a RS if and only if the average rate of exploitation of all workers
is positive, which in turn holds if and only if each and every worker is ex-
ploited (see Roemer, 1981). The following analysis will show, however, that
this result no longer holds once general convex economies with heterogeneous
consumption demands are considered.
Let T be the nonempty, ﬁnite set of types of workers with heteroge-
neous consumption demands and let the generic element of T be denoted
as τ.L e t F (τ) ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of workers of type τ.B y d e ﬁn-
ition,
P
τ∈T F (τ)=1 .G i v e n p ∈ Rm
+, the consumption demand of the
τ-type worker per unit of income is denoted as dτ (p) ∈ Rm
+. For all τ ∈ T,
the demand function dτ (·) is assumed to be derived from a continuous,
strictly monotonic, strictly quasi-concave, and homothetic utility function,
and pdτ (p)=1for any p ∈ Rm
+ normalised to
Pm
j=1 pj =1 .
Further, for all τ ∈ T, ατ
0 i st h ea m o u n to fl a b o u rs p e n tb yτ-type workers.
Therefore given p ∈ Rm
+ a n da na g g r e g a t ep r o d u c t i o np l a nα ∈ P, and noting
that workers are abundant relative to productive assets, aggregate labour
demanded α0 is equal to aggregate labour expended:
P
τ∈T ατ
0 = α0. Then,



















An economy is now speciﬁed by a list ET =
¡
P;N;Ω;T;(F (τ))τ∈T ;(dτ (·))τ∈T
¢
,
and in what follows it will be denoted simply as ET for the sake of notational
simplicity. The equilibrium notion for the economies ET with heterogeneous
workers’ demands is formalised as follows:




,w h e r ep ∈ Rm
+,s u c ht h a t :
(a) ∀ν ∈ N, αν ∈ Aν (p,1) (proﬁt maximisation);






where b α ≡
P







(c) ∀τ ∈ T, pdτ (p)=1 ;a n d





5 ω (social feasibility),
where α ≡
P
ν∈N αν and ω ≡
P
ν∈N ων.
Deﬁnition 6 is similar to Deﬁnition 5, except that the aggregate consumption
demands of employed workers are endogenous and possibly heterogeneous.
The next result proves the existence of a RST for these general economies.
Proposition 3: For all τ ∈ T,l e tdτ (·) be a strictly monotone, continuous
demand function whose range is within the consumption set C ⊆ Rm
+.U n d e r
A1 and A2, a RST exists for the economy ET.
Proof. Straightforward modiﬁcation of the proof of Corollary 2.8 in Roemer
(1981, p.44).
The next Theorem establishes a preliminary result concerning the corre-
spondence between the existence of positive proﬁts and the exploitation of
the average worker, under Deﬁnition 2.
Theorem 3: Under A1∼A3, in the economy ET, let dτ (·) be derived from
continuous, strictly monotonic, strictly quasi-concave, and homethetic utility
function deﬁned on the consumption set C ⊆ Rm
+, which can be either un-




















be a RST with positive total
proﬁts:
pb α − α0 = p ·
¡







Since p ∈ Rm





by Deﬁnition 6(b), the last strict


































be a RST with zero aggregate proﬁts. Thus, p ·
¡

















> 0, then it follows that pj =0 . However, since every



















< α0.T h e n ,l.v.(b α) < α0, which implies
that there exists α0 ∈ P such that b α
0 = b α and α0
0 < α0. Because of the





0 = α0.I f
b α > 0,t h e nb α
00 > b α,s ot h a t b α
α0 ∈ b P◦ (α0 =1 )by b α00
α0 ∈ ∂ b P (α0 =1 ) .L e t
b α
0
i = b αi =0for some i. In this case, b α
00 > b α does not hold. However,
by A2, there exists c ∈ b P (α0 =1 )∩ Rm
++ which is suﬃciently close to b α00
α0.
Then, c> b α
α0 holds, so that b α



















> 0 for some c ∈ b P (α0 =1 )∩Rm
++ with c> b α
α0.T h i si s




















Theorem 3 derives a general relation between proﬁts and exploitation at
the average, or aggregate, level. By Theorem 3, it is possible to conclude that
the exploitation of the working class is a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for the existence of exploitation. Yet, it is unclear that this result provides
all the necessary information concerning the FMT. In fact, although work-
ers here may have heterogeneous demand functions for consumption goods,
they are identical in terms of their labour endowments and labour skills,
their preferences for leisure, and other labour conditions. Therefore one may
argue that a robust extension of the FMT should provide deﬁnite answers
concerning the exploitation status of each and every worker. Although this
issue is usually ignored in the literature, this is only due to the simplifying
assumption of a representative worker. Arguably, the classic (albeit often
implicit) understanding of the FMT is that it concerns all members of the
working class, and not just the average worker.
So, the theoretically relevant question is whether, under Deﬁnition 2, the
FMT holds for each and every worker in general convex economies with
heterogeneous consumption demands. The next result provides a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the FMT to hold in this sense.





be a RST for the
economy ET. Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) total proﬁts are positive if and only if e(dτ (p)) > 0 for any τ ∈ T;
(ii) total proﬁts are positive if and only if dτ (p) ∈ b P◦ (α0 =1 )for any τ ∈ T.
18Proof. It suﬃces to prove that dτ (p) ∈ b P◦ (α0 =1 )holds for any τ ∈ T if
and only if e(dτ (p)) > 0 for any τ ∈ T. First, let dτ (p) ∈ b P◦ (α0 =1 )hold
for any τ ∈ T.T h i si m p l i e sf o ra n yτ ∈ T,t h e r ee x i s t sb α ∈ ∂ b P (α0 =1 )such
that b α >d τ (p). Then, since P is a convex cone satisfying A2, there exists
α∗ ∈ P with α∗
0 < 1,s u c ht h a tb α
∗ ∈ ∂ b P (α0 = α∗
0) and b α
∗ ≥ dτ (p).T h i sa l s o
implies e(dτ (p)) > 0 for any τ ∈ T.
Conversely, suppose that there exists τ0 ∈ T such that dτ0 (p) / ∈ b P◦ (α0 =1 ) .
Then, either dτ0 (p) ∈ ∂ b P (α0 =1 ) or dτ0 (p) / ∈ P (α0 =1 ) .I f dτ0 (p) / ∈
P (α0 =1 ) ,t h e nf o ra n yα0 ∈ P (α0 =1 ) , b α
0 ¸ dτ0 (p) holds. If dτ0 (p) ∈
∂ b P (α0 =1 ) , then it implies together with A3 that, for any α0 ∈ P (α0 =1 ) ,
b α
0 ¤ dτ0 (p).I n s u m , f o r a n y α0 ∈ P (α0 =1 ) ,e i t h e rb α
0 = dτ0 (p) or
b α




5 0 for this
τ0 ∈ T.
Theorem 4 states that, at any RST, the correspondence between the ex-
istence of proﬁts and the exploitation of every worker is equivalent to the
correspondence between the existence of proﬁts and the existence of some
surplus labour - in the sense that each worker’s optimal consumption bundle
could be produced with strictly less labour than is actually supplied by the
worker. Theorem 4 is interesting because it provides a general characterisa-
tion result, but also because it allows us to derive the main conclusion on
Morishima’s (1974) classic deﬁnition of exploitation. The next result, in fact,
proves that if the latter deﬁnition is adopted, it is possible that proﬁts are
positive but some types of workers are not exploited.8












< 0 for some τ∗ ∈ T.
Proof. 1. (The economy) Let m =2 , N = {ν},a n dω = ων =( 2 .5,0.75).
Let T = {τ,τ0} with F (τ)=0 .5=F (τ0), and let the demand functions
dτ (·) and dτ0 (·) be derived from continuous, monotonic, quasi-concave, and
8In this paper, a negative exploitation rate simply implies that (some types of) workers
are not exploited. In a more general model, however, one might deﬁne exploiters as those
agents whose labour supplied is smaller than the value of their labour power. Based on
such deﬁnition, Corollary 1 could be interpreted as suggesting that some propertyless
workers are actually exploiters.
19homothetic utility functions. Furthermore let:
d
τ (p)=( 0 .5,1.25) and d
τ0














































The production possibility set of this economy, P,i saclosed, convex cone
subset of R5 such that
1) 0 ∈ P;
2) P (α0 =1 )=co{α1,α2,α3,α4}.
P satisﬁes all the assumptions on the production set, including A3.










0 =0 .5 is a RST.F i r s t ,n o t et h a tp∗ is an ef-
ﬁciency price for α∗. Thus, since p∗α∗ + α∗
0 = p∗ων <p ∗α + α0 for any
α ∈ P (α0 =1 )\{α1}, it follows that α∗ ∈ Aν (p∗,1),a n dD e ﬁnition 6(a)
holds. Next, since dτ (p∗)=( 0 .5,1.25) and dτ0 (p∗)=( 2 .5,0.25),D e ﬁnition
6(c) holds, too. Moreover, since ατ
0 = ατ0









(1.5,0.75),s ot h a tb α









,s ot h a t









=( 2 .5,0.75) = ω,s o
that Deﬁnition 6(d) holds.
Insert Figure 2 around here.
3. (FMT) This RS
T yields positive proﬁts: p∗b α
∗ − α∗
0 = 1
6 > 0,9 but
employed workers of type τ are not exploited according to Deﬁnition 2, since
dτ (p∗) > b α





















< 1. The last inequal-
ity follows from l.v.(b α









,a n df o ra n yb α
0 = λb α
1+(1− λ) b α
2 ∈















20by Theorem 4. To prove that the latter inequality is strict, it suﬃces to note
that dτ (p∗) > b α




=1 , implies l.v.(dτ (p∗)) > 1.
Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 imply that outside of simple Leontief economies,
and even under A3, Morishima’s (1974) classic deﬁnition of exploitation does
not preserve one of the key tenets of the Marxian theory of labour exploita-
tion, namely the correspondence between proﬁt making by capitalists and
the exploitation of propertyless workers. The FMT does not hold in the
sense that within the set of propertyless agents earning the same income and
working the same amount of time, there may be some workers who are not
exploited even if proﬁts are positive. It is worth stressing the importance of
the stronger interpretation of the FMT adopted: in the economy constructed
in the proof of Corollary 1, workers spend the same amount of labour time
with the same labour skills, earn the same wage rate, and face the same
budget constraint. They are completely identical, except for the actual bun-
dle consumed. In this situation, one would expect workers to have exactly
the same exploitation status. Instead, Corollary 1 shows that if Deﬁnition
2 is adopted, some types of workers are exploited while others paradoxically
emerge as exploiters in equilibrium, due to diﬀerences in their subjective con-
sumption demands, even though all types of workers face the same objective
labour conditions (identical labour supply, income, skills, and so on).
Finally, although Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 focus on the notion of RS
T
formalised in Deﬁnition 6, similar results could be derived by focusing on
Balanced Growth Equilibria as in Morishima (1974). The negative conclu-
sions on the ability of Morishima’s (1974) famous deﬁnition of exploitation
to capture the core intuitions of Marxian exploitation theory do not depend
on the speciﬁc equilibrium notion adopted.
4A N e w D e ﬁnition of Labour Exploitation
Given the epistemological status of the FMT in exploitation theory, the neg-
ative results derived in the previous section suggest that another deﬁnition
must be found that preserves the core insights of Marxian theory. This is
the task of this section. The key intuition of the following analysis is that,
despite all of their diﬀerences, the deﬁnitions proposed by Morishima (1974)
and Roemer (1982) suﬀer from the same conceptual and formal problem. For
both approaches deﬁne the value of labour power - that is, the amount of
21labour ‘received’ by workers - based on the bundle of goods consumed by
workers, thus making purely subjective and idiosyncratic factors central in
exploitation theory. To be sure, in the analysis of the economy, the essential
heterogeneity of workers should be taken into account, rather than assumed
away as in the standard literature. Yet the deﬁnition of the value of labour
power should depend on income, or purchasing power, rather than on the
choice of a speciﬁc consumption bundle. Again, the notion of exploitation
s h o u l db es u c ht h a tt w oa g e n t sw h oe a r nt h es a m ei n c o m eb ys u p p l y i n g
the same amount of homogeneous labour are identiﬁed as having the same
exploitation status, regardless of their consumption choices.
Formally, the labour value of a bundle of commodities is still given by
Deﬁnition 3 above. However, the deﬁnition of the value of labour power
focuses on the income received by workers and exploitation is measured by
the diﬀerence between the (one unit of) labour supplied by every worker and
the minimal amount of direct labour socially necessary to provide the agent










B (p,1) is the set of bundles that a worker can purchase, per unit of labour
performed, using up all her income. Then:






1 − minfμ∈B(p,1) l.v.(fμ;p,1)
minfμ∈B(p,1) l.v.(fμ;p,1)
.
It is easy to verify that the value of labour power - minfμ∈B(p,1) l.v.(fμ;p,1)
- is well-deﬁned, since for any p ∈ Rm
+ \{0},t h e r ee x i s t sfμ ∈ B (p,1) such
that φ(fμ;p,1) 6= ∅. Moreover, as already discussed, it has a positive value
whenever p ∈ Rm
+ \{0},s ot h a teμ (p,1) is well-deﬁned.
Thus, the value of labour power in Deﬁnition 7 focuses not on the work-
er’s consumption vector, but rather on the income she earned at a RS. By





if the minimum amount of labour socially necessary to provide μ with her
(unit) labour income w =1 , is less than unity.
The next results show that a general, robust relation between positive
proﬁts and the exploitation of each and every worker can be derived under
Deﬁnition 7. Theorem 5 focuses on the economy with homogeneous workers:




be a RS for an economy
E(P,H,b,Ω). Then, total proﬁts are positive if and only if eμ (p,1) > 0 for





be a RS with positive total proﬁts:
pb α − α0 = p · (b α − α0b) > 0.S i n c ep ∈ Rm
+ and b α = α0b by Deﬁnition 5(b),
this implies b α ≥ α0b.L e t f ∈ Rm
+ be such that pf = pb and α0f = tb α
for some 0 <t<1. Note that such bundle exists, since p · (b α − α0b)=
p · (b α − α0f) > 0.S i n c e l.v.(b α;p,1) 5 α0,i tf o l l o w sf r o mt ∈ (0,1) that
l.v.(tb α;p,1) = l.v.(α0f;p,1) < α0. By linearity, l.v.(f;p,1) < 1,w h i c h




< 1,s ot h a teτ (p,1) > 0 for every τ ∈ T.




b eaR Ss u c ht h a tp·(b α − α0b)=0 .B yD e ﬁnition 5(b), b α = α0b.T h e r e f o r e ,
if p ∈ Rm
++,t h e nb α = α0b.L e tf ∈ Rm
+ be such that pf = pb and α0f = tb α
for some 0 <t5 1. Then, p · (b α − α0f)=0and α0f = tb α imply that




,a n yp r o ﬁt-rate-maximising
production points α0 ∈ P (p,1) ∩ ∂P (α0 =1 )has the property that pb α
0 =1
(by Deﬁnition 5(a) and the convex cone property of P). Thus, for any α0 ∈
P (p,1)∩∂P (α0 =1 ) , pb α
0 =
pb α
α0 = pb.T h i si m p l i e st h a tf o ra n yf ∈ Rm
+ such





that eτ (p,1) = 0 for every τ ∈ T.
If p ∈ Rm
+,i tm a yb et h ec a s et h a tb α ≥ α0b.H o w e v e r ,a sp·(b α − α0b)=0
and αν ∈ Aν (p,1) for all ν ∈ N, b ∈ ∂ b P (α0 =1 )holds. By the same
argument as in the case with p ∈ Rm
++, for any f ∈ Rm
+ such that pf = pb,




=1 ,s ot h a teτ (p,1) =
0 for every τ ∈ T.
It is worth noting that if Deﬁnition 7 is adopted, neither A30 nor A3
are necessary to prove the FMT. This result is conﬁrmed by the next The-
orem, which establishes the robustness of the FMT also in economies with
heterogeneous consumption demands.





be a RST for
ET. Then, total proﬁts are positive if and only if eτ (p,1) > 0 for every
τ ∈ T.
















with aggregate net output b α and labour expended α0.L e tb α
0 ≡ b α
α0. Then, as
shown in the proof of Theorem 5, there exists some t ∈ (0,1] such that ptb α
0 =











be a RST with positive total prof-
its: pb α − α0 = p ·
¡





> 0.T h u s , pb α
0 > 1=ptb α
0,





< 1 by the
cone property of P,s i n c eb α
0 ∈ ∂ b P (α0 =1 )by proﬁt maximisation. Thus,









beaRST such that pb α−α0 = p·
¡






0. Then, pb α
0 =1=ptb α
0,a n ds ot =1 . Then, using the same argument as
in the (⇐) part of the proof of Theorem 5, we can see that for any f ∈ Rm
+










=1 ,s ot h a teτ (p,1) = 0 for every τ ∈ T.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper analyses the mathematical Marxian theory of exploitation, fo-
cusing on the correspondence between positive proﬁts and the existence of
exploitation, and on the notion of reproducible solution. It is shown that,
contrary to the received view, neither of the two main deﬁnitions of ex-
ploitation in the literature - proposed, respectively, by Morishima (1974)
and Roemer (1982) - preserves the Fundamental Marxian Theorem in gen-
eral convex economies. Given the central theoretical and epistemological role
of the FMT in the Marxian theory of exploitation, this raises serious doubts
on both approaches. The main shortcoming of the received deﬁn i t i o n si st h e i r
focus on the speciﬁc consumption bundle chosen by workers in the deﬁnition
of the value of labour power (the amount of labour ‘received’ by workers in
exchange for their own labour expenditure), which makes exploitation sta-
tus dependent on purely subjective factors. From this perspective, the two
main received deﬁnitions arguably fail to describe a fundamental feature of
the Marxian theory, namely class struggle under historical materialism, since
they make the exploitation concept dependent on workers’ subjective views
of the world: two workers with the same income, labour supply, and en-
24dowments may have diﬀerent exploitation status based on their idiosyncratic
c h o i c e sa sc o n s u m e r s . 10 An alternative deﬁnition is proposed, which deﬁnes
the value of labour power based on workers’ income. Under this new deﬁn-
ition a robust correspondence between positive proﬁts and the exploitation
of labour can be established in general convex economies with heterogeneous
agents.
Two ﬁnal remarks are worth making at this point about the robustness
of our conclusions and the appeal of the proposed deﬁnition of exploitation.
First, the economic models analysed in this paper are more general than those
usually considered in the literature on Marxian exploitation. Yet they still
contain a number of fairly strong simplifying assumptions, such as the neglect
of consumption/leisure tradeoﬀs, workers’ savings, capitalists’ consumption,
skills heterogeneity, and so on. One may legitimately wonder whether the
FMT would still hold under the deﬁnition of exploitation proposed if the
latter assumptions are violated. This topic is the object of ongoing work
(Veneziani and Yoshihara, 2010), but preliminary results suggest that the
main conclusions of this paper are robust. The theoretical and analytical
emphasis on income earned, rather than actual consumption bundles, allows
for a signiﬁcant generalisation of standard insights.
Second, this paper focuses on the FMT as a key property of Marxian
theory, but Roemer (1982) argued that an analogous epistemological role
is played by the Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP): any
deﬁnition of exploitation should be such that agents in the upper classes
emerge as exploiters and agents in the lower classes are exploited. Yoshi-
hara (2010) has shown that neither Morishima’s (1974) nor Roemer’s (1982)
deﬁnition preserves the CECP in general convex cone economies. In partic-
ular, an agent in the capitalist class may not be an exploiter if Morishima’s
(1974) deﬁnition is adopted; whereas an agent in the working class may not
be exploited if Roemer’s (1982) deﬁnition is adopted. Instead, the deﬁnition
proposed in this paper does preserve the CECP in general (see Yoshihara,
2010), and thus it seems superior to standard approaches in this respect, too.
10We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the dubious relevance of
subjective factors in Marxian theory.
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0 ˆ(1 ) α ∂= P